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INTRODUCTION

Stanley Stantyn owned the real property located at 13598 S. Deer Mountain
Circle, Riverton, Utah 84065 until the property was foreclosed by the first
mortgage. After paying costs of the foreclosure and the amount owed to the first
mortgage, there remained excess proceeds in the amount of $48,883.81.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29, the trustee deposited the excess proceeds
vJ

with the Third District Court. Stantyn assigned his claim to the excess proceeds
to Emerald Recovery, LLC, who filed a petition with the Third District Court
making a claim to the proceeds. Veripro Solutions, Inc. also filed a petition with
the Third District Court, claiming an interest in the as an agent of Nationstar
Mortgage, a previous second mortgagee.

011

After several evidentiary hearings on the matter, the district court found
that Veripro's claim was invalid because Nationstar Mortgage cancelled the debt

vi

owed by Stantyn. Veripro asserts that the cancelation of the debt was a unilateral
mistake and should be set aside. Veripro contends the unilateral mistake took
place when Stantyn asked for a payoff letter in August 2017, which caused
Nationstar to send a letter stating nothing was owed under the loan. Veripro's
argument mistakenly points to the payoff letter as a unilateral mistake. The
payoff letter can not be the basis of the unilateral mistake because Nationstar
Mortgage's records show the cancellation of the debt took place on March 19,
2015-approximately 18 months prior to the payoff letter.

1
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Statement of the Issue was not adequately framed by Appellant.

Up

Appellant contends that the district court erred when it enforced the paid-in-full
letter. [Appellant Br. at 1.] The Appellant misunderstands the district court's

'iJ

findings and order. The district court did not enforce the paid-in-full letter, as
Appellant suggests, the district court enforced Nationstar's March 19, 2015
cancellation of the debt. [R. 137,r 15; R. 138 ,r 26.] The district court only relied
on the paid-in-full letter as one part of the evidence in support of its findings that
Nationstar's intended to cancel the debt in full. [R. 137,m 15, 17- 21; R. 138 ,r 2627.] Therefore, Appellant should have asked this court to review whether the
district court erred when it found that Nationstar intended to cancel the debt in
~

full on March 19, 2015.

Standard of Review: A district court's findings of fact are reviewed
"according to the standard set out in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which
provides: 'Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ... " Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg.

Corp., 2002 UT 94, ,r 12, 54 P .3d 1177, 1181. "[A]n appellant who challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of fact has the burden of combing
the record for and compiling all of the evidence that supports
the finding of fact and explaining why that evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding of fact. Id.
~

2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The district court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law [R. 135-141], which provide a proper statement of the case. The following
vJ

facts are from the district court's findings and order.
1.

On July 13, 2016, the successor trustee submitted to the district

court the amount of $48,883.81 in excess funds resulting from a foreclosure and
sale of the subject property. The district court gave notice to all potential
claimants.
~

2.

On July 15, 2016, Emerald Recovery, LLC, as assignee of the

property owner Stanley Stantyn., filed and served a Petition for Adjudication of
Priority of Excess Proceeds. On August 23, 2016, Veripro Solutions, Inc. filed a
Counter-Petition for Apportionment of Excess Proceeds. The Petitions included
the statutory 45-day notice to all other potential claimants pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 57-1-29(3). No other petitions, counter-petitions, or claims have been filed
in this matter and the 45-day notice period has run.
3.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29, and at the request of the

vj

parties, the district court set and held hearings on November 30, 2016, December
22, 2016, and January 4, 2017 to determine the priority of funds of the
petitioning parties.
4.

The disctrict took evidence through documents and proffered

testimony.

3
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5.

After taking evidence the parties made legal arguments regarding the

priority claims.
6.

After hearing the evidence and the legal argument, the district court

made the following findings, conclusions, and order:
7.

Stanley Stantyn was the owner of the property located 13598 S. Deer

Mountain Circle, Riverton, Utah 84065 ("Property").
8.

On May 5, 2005, Stantyn borrowed approximately $240,000.00

from Bank of New York Mellon FKA the Bank of New York ("BNYM") against the
Property and secured the mortgage with a deed of trust ("First Mortgage").
g.

On or about the same day, Stantyn borrowed approximately

$60,000 from Michigan Fidelity Acceptance Corp DBA Franklin Direct and

secured the second mortgage with a deed of trust ("Second Mortgage").
10.

The Second Mortgage and deed of trust were later assigned to

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar").
11.

Nationstar engaged and hired Veripro Solutions, Inc. ("Veripro") as

its agent to service and collect funds on the loans owned by Nationstar.
12.

In this matter, Veripro was directed by Nationstar to collect sums

owed under the Second Mortgage.
13.

eTitle Insurance Agency acted as the Successor Trustee under the

first deed of trust executed for the benefit of the BNYM.

4
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14.
~

Stantyn defaulted under the terms of the First Mortgage and eTitle

Insurance Agency conducted a Trustee's Sale of the Property pursuant to the
terms of the deed of trust and in accordance with Utah law.
15.

After the foreclosure sale, the sum of $48,883.81 was submitted to

the Court as excess proceeds on or about July 13, 2016 by the Successor Trustee
of the deed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29 ("Proceeds").
16.

Pursuant to an ASSIGNMENT AND RIGHTS TO ALL EXCESS

PROCEEDS dated July 15, 2016 from Stanley Stantyn, ("Emerald Assignment")
Emerald has a bona fide interest in the excess sale proceeds.
17.

On July 15, 2016, prior to the execution of the Emerald Assignment,

Stantyn called N ationstar, in the presence of Emerald's representative, to verify
there was not a balance owing under the Second Mortgage.
18.

During the phone call with N ationstar, the representative informed

~

Stantyn that there was not a balance owing under the loan.
19.

The document titled "Collection History Profile" produced by

Nationstar documents the call and includes the notes "customer stated he wanted
to know status of loan adv [sic] customer status of loan is paid off."
20.

The Nationstar representative was not aware Emerald was listening

to Stantyn's phone call.

5
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21.

The Collection History Profile further reveals that the loan was

approved for a "Prin. Non-Cash Adjustm [sic]" and a "Payoff Nocash" on March
19, 2015.
22.

On August 8, 2016, Stantyn called Nationstar again to verify the

~

account balance of the loan was zero. The August 8th phone call is documented in
the Collection History Profile.
23.

The Collection History Profile notes "LOAN TERMS INQUIRY...

since the loan was paid off, there is no longer available balance on the account."
18. The Collection History Profile further notes on the same date: "DOCUMENT
REQUEST INQUIRY... borrower requested for the paid in full letter to be sent via
mail. Completed. Informed him of tat [sic] to receive."
24.

4w

On August 12, 2016, the Collection History Profile makes the

following significant notes: • "LITIGATION SERVICE RELEASE REFERRAL
~

RECEIVED ... BOA address this to BANA and Legal for confirmation of handling.
• "LITIGATION SERVICE RELEASE REFERRAL COMPLETE"
25.

On September 6, 2016, Stantyn called Nationstar to inquire about

the payoff statement. In response to the request, Nationstar sent Stantyn the
payoff letter via e-mail to the e-mail address stanstantyn@gmail.com.
26.

The payoff letter references the subject loan number and states

"Nationstar Mortgage LLC (FKA Centex Home Equity, LLC) received payment in
full for the above-reference loan number on 3/19/2015. The release of lien has

6
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been initiated and will be sent to the appropriate recording jurisdiction for
recordation."
27.

The "release of lien" is presumably referring to a deed of

reconveyance. No deed of reconveyance has been recorded on the Property.

28.

At the November 30, 2016 hearing, Veripro questioned the

authenticity of the payoff letter. The Court continued the hearing until December
22, 2016,

and then to January 4, 2017 for the sole purpose of determining the

authenticity of the letter.
29.

On January 4, 2017, the parties appeared before the Court in a

telephone conference. At that conference the parties confirmed that Nationstar
had recently signed an affidavit verifying that it sent the payoff letter to Stantyn
on September 6, 2016.

30.

In the affidavit, Nationstar also claimed that the payoff letter "was

mistakenly generated and sent." There was no explanation as to how the alleged
mistake occurred. Importantly, Nationstar did not claim that the person who sent
the letter was not authorized to do so. Nor did Nationstar claim that it sent the
letter based on a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct by Stantyn.
31.

Nationstar's new claim that the letter was sent by mistake is not

credible or supported by the Collection History Profile, which demonstrates that
the payoff letter was sent because N ationstar considered the debt to be paid in
full whether through cancellation or charge off or otherwise.

vJ1
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32.

According to the Collection History Profile, Nationstar declined

Stantyn's first request for a payoff letter in March 2015 because "acct was not
paid in full but charged off." There was no evidence presented by Nationstar that
its agent did not have access to this note when it responded to Stantyn's second
request. The Collection History Profile also indicates that the legal department
was asked "for confirmation of handling." Nationstar sent the payoff letter to
Stantyn on September 6, 2016, a few weeks after the apparent referral to the legal
department on August 12, 2016.

33.

Indeed, it was only after Nationstar received notice of the Proceeds

and this proceeding that it claimed the payoff letter was invalid.
34.

Nationstar is not entitled to any of the Proceeds because it charged

off the loan and cancelled the debt.·
35.

Veriprio argues that it was assigned the loan file by Nationstar and

therefore Nationstar did not have authority to charge off the loan or cancel the
debt.
36.

The Court rejects that argument based upon the fact that Nationstar

hired Veripro as its agent to enforce Nationstar's rights to under its loans.
37.

The terms of the Revocable Special and Limited Power of Attorney in

Favor of Contractor clarify that Veripro has authority to act as Nationstar's agent
in servicing the loans. Nationstar does not forfeit any of its rights under the
agreement and therefore Nationstar has ultimate control in deciding how to
enforce, waive, or preserve its rights under the loans.
8
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38.

As the agent of Nationstar, Veripro's interest in the proceeds cannot

be superior to those of Nationstar and it is bound by Nationstar's cancellation of
the debt as confirmed in the payoff letter.
39.

Because Veripro has not disputed any of the material facts set forth

above, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.

40.

Accordingly, the Court finds that based upon the evidence before it,

Nationstar intended to cancel the debt. The payoff letter is not an agreement that
cancelled the debt, but a confirmation of Nationstar's prior decision to cancel the
debt.
41.

Emerald is entitled to claim all the excess proceeds from the sale of

the property remaining in the trust account created by the Court in this case,
which is approximately $48,883.81.

42.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29, Emerald provided required

notice of this Petition for Adjudication of Priority of Excess Proceeds to all
interested parties as set forth in the trustee's affidavit with the Court on or about
July 15, 2016.

9
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The doctrine of unilateral mistake does not apply here because the
September 2016 payoff letter did not modify a presently existing agreement
between the parties. The September 2016 payoff letter merely memorialized what

l'iJ

took place in March 2015, when Nationstar cancelled the debt in full.
This Court does not ~eed to reach the issue of unilateral mistake, however,
because Appellant's dispute is rooted in the district court's findings of fact. The
Appellant has not marshaled the evidence to show the district court erred in its
findings of fact.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined There was No
Unilateral Mistake.

A. The doctrine of unilateral mistake does not apply.
A unilateral mistake provides a basis for reformation or rescission of a

contract. See Red Bridge Capital LLC v. Dos Lagos LLC, 2016 UT App 162, ,r 15,
381 P.3d 1147 (emphasis added); see also Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008
UT 20, ,r 15, 182 P.3d 326 (noting that a mistake can invalidate "a written contract"
and that a "contract is ... voidable for ... mistake"); Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829
P.2d 135, 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reciting the elements of unilateral mistake as
requiring the existence of a contract). Indeed, Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778
P.2d 1 ({Jtah 1989), a case upon which Veripro heavily relies, applies the doctrine
in the context of a "memorialization of an agreement." Id. at 8. Here, the letter at

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

issue was not a written contract that altered the status of the parties or the putative
debt. Rather, it was a mere memorialization of the status of the debt. Veripro has
not alleged, much less demonstrated, that the letter was a contract, nor has it
provided authority indicating that the doctrine of unilateral mistake extends to a
memorialization of an existing statement of fact. Accordingly, the district court did
not err in denying Veripro's claim of unilateral mistake.

B. The record does not show that borrower understood the payoff letter to be
a mistake.
Veripro claims that the borrower "well understood he was not entitled to a
Payoff Letter." [App't Br., at 6.] However, there is nothing in the record to support
this contention. Stantyn called Nationstar on three occasions to inquire about his
balance. Each time Nationstar informed him that the balance was zero. Thus,
because Nationstar had the opportunity to look at the account, determine the
amount owing, and process the letter, Nationstar, to the extent the letter was a
~

mistake, did not exercise ordinary diligence, which is fatal to its claim. See

Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 1

Veripro attempts to extend the holding of Stangl by claiming that it allows for
rescission "even if the mistake is due to negligence." App't Br., at 5. However,
both Stangl and Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah
1998), the case Stangl cites for the applicable proposition, indicate that
negligence is excused only in the context of reformation. Because Veripro is not
seeking reformation of a valid contract, and because rescission based on mistake
requires the exercising of ordinary diligence, see Southern Title Guar. Co., Inc. v.
Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Veripro's argument is
unavailing.
1.

va
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In fact, the trial court's findings-which are unchallenged on appealindicate that "there was no explanation as to how the alleged mistake occurred."

~

The trial court further determined that the evidence did not show that "Nationstar
sent the letter based on a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct by
Stantyn." Finally, the trial court held that "Nationstar's claim that the letter was
sent by mistake is not credible or supported by the Collection History Profile,
which demonstrates that the payoffletter was sent because Nationstar considered
the debt to be paid in full whether through cancellation or charge off or otherwise."

Because Veripro's argument amounts to a disagreement with the trial court's
findings of fact, Veripro was required to marshal the evidence and demonstrate
that the findings "are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence." 438 Maint Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 69, 99 P.3d 801.
Because Veripro has failed to do either,2 and because all evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, id. ,r 72, this Court should

~

affirm the trial court's decision.
CONCLUSION

This Court should uphold the district court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Appellant has not shown the district court erred when it
concluded that Nationstar intended to cancel Stantyn's debt on March 2015. Even
2. Veripro suggests that the Collection History Profile suggests how the mistake
occurred. App't Br., at 6-7. However, Veripro has not argued-and therefore has
not satisfied-its high burden of demonstrating the trial court's finding was
clearly erroneous and that it was "without adequate evidentiary support." See
Hale v. Big H. Const., Inc., 2012 UT App 283, ,r 9,288 P.3d 1046.
12
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~

~

if the September 2016 payoff letter modified the debt further, there is not good
~

reason to find that it occurred due to unilateral mistake because there is no
evidence that Stantyn understood the issuance of the payoff letter to be a mistake.
To the contrary, the evidence supports the contention that Stantyn believed his
payment obligation to Nationstar was zero.

II.
lj)
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ADDENDUM

• Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29
• Order for Release of Funds

15
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 57. Real Estate
Chapter 1. Conveyances (Refs &Annas)
U.C.A 1953 § 57-1-29
§ 57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale--Disposition

Currentness

~

(l)(a) The trustee shall apply the proceeds of a trustee's sale in the following order:

(i) first, to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the trustee's
and attorney fees actually incurred not to exceed any amount provided for in the trust deed;

(ii) second, to payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed; and

(iii)(A) the balance, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled to the proceeds; or

(B) the trustee, in the trustee's discretion, may deposit the balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district
court of the county in which the sale took place.

(b) If the proceeds are deposited with the clerk of the district court, the trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk
setting forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known claimants, including known addresses.

(c) Upon depositing the balance and filing the affidavit, the trustee is discharged from all further responsibility and
the clerk shall deposit the proceeds with the state treasurer subject to the order of the district court.

(2) The clerk shall give notice of the deposited funds to all claimants listed in the trustee's affidavit within 15 days of
receiving the affidavit of deposit from the trustee.

(3)(a) A claimant may file a petition for adjudication of priority to the funds if the claimant pays to the court clerk a
filing fee in the amount of $50.

(b) A petitioner requesting funds under Subsection (3)( a) shall give notice of the petition to all claimants listed in the
trustee's affidavit and to any other claimants known to the petitioner.

(c) The petitioner's notice under Subsection (3)(b) shall specify that all claimants have 60 days to contest the petition
by affidavit or counter-petition .
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(d) If no affidavit or counter-petition is filed within 60 days of the notice required by Subsection (3)(c), the court shall,
without a hearing, enter an order directing the clerk of the court or the county treasurer to disburse the funds to the
petitioner according to the petition.

(4)(a) If a petition for adjudication is contested by affidavit or counter-petition, the district court shall, within 20 days,
conduct a hearing to establish the priorities of the parties to the deposited funds and give notice to all known claimants
of the date and time of the hearing.

(b) At a hearing under Subsection (4)(a), the court shall establish the priorities of the parties to the deposited funds
and enter an order directing the clerk of the court or county treasurer to disburse the funds according to the court's
determination.
~

v,

(5) A person having or claiming to have an interest in the disposition of funds deposited with the court under Subsection
(1) who fails to appear and assert the person's claim is barred from any claim to the funds after the entry of the court's
order under Subsection (4).

Credits
Laws 1961, c. 181, § 11; Laws 1997, c. 215, § 7, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 236, § 11, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008,
c. 230, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2017, c. 465, § 2, eff. May 9, 2017.

Notes of Decisions (3)
U.C.A. 1953 § 57-1-29, UT ST§ 57-1-29
Current through 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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The Order of tbe Court is stated below: l :.- 1~·~;{,~ . \
Dated: February 13. 2017
Isl LA{.Jaj\
06:41:46 PM
District.C§fiif}u4g~./

Brennan H. Moss (I 0267)
PIA ANDERSON DORIUS REYNARD & MOSS, LLC
136 East South Temple, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 350-9009
Facsimile: (801) 350-9010
E-mail: bmoss@padrm.com
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Attorneys for Claimant, Emerald Recovery, LLC
IN THE TffiRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATIER OF THE FORECLOSURE
OF THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT

l 3598 S. Deer Mountain Circle
Riverton, Utah 84065

ORDER FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS

Case No. 160904386 LM
Judge Laura Scott

Formerly Owned by Stanley Stantyn

On July 13, 20 I 6, the successor trustee submitted to the Court the amount of $48,883.81 in excess
funds resulting from a foreclosure and sale of the subject property. The Court gave notice to all potential
claimants.
On July 15, 2016, Emerald Recovery, LLC, as assignee of the property owner Stanley Stantyn, filed
and served a Petition for Adjudication of Priority of Excess Proceeds. On August 23, 2016, Veripro
Solutions, Inc. filed a Counter-Petition for Apportionment of Excess Proceeds. The Petitions included the
statutory 45-day notice to all other potential claimants pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29(3). No other
petitions, counter-petitions, or cJaims have been filed in this matter and the 45-day notice period has run.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29, and at the request of the parties, the Court set and held
hearings on November 30, 2016, December 22, 2016, and January 4, 2017 to determine the priority offunds
of the petitioning parties. Brennan Moss appeared on behalf of Emerald Recovery, LLC, and John Anderson
appeared on behalf ofVeripro Solutions, Inc. The Court took evidence through documents and proffered
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testimony. After taking evidence the parties made legal arguments regarding the priority claims. Having
reviewed the documents, the proffered testimony, the petitions, considering the legal arguments, and any
other considerations or matters the Court deems appropriate, the COURT HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS:
1. Stanley Stantyn was the owner of the property located 13598 S. Deer Mountain Circle, Riverton, Utah

84065 ("Property").
2. On May 5, 2005, Stantyn borrowed approximately $240,000.00 from Bank of New York Mellon FKA the
Bank of New York ("BNYM') against the Property and secured the mortgage with a deed of trust ("First
Mortgage").
3. On or about the same day, Stantyn borrowed approximately $60,000 from Michigan Fidelity Acceptance
Corp OBA Franklin Direct and secured the second mortgage with a deed of trust ('"Second Mortgage").
4. The Second Mortgage and deed of trust were later assigned to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Nationstar").
5. Nationstar engaged and hired Veripro Solutions, Inc. ("Veripro") as its agent to service and collect funds
on the loans owned by Nationstar.
6. In this matter, Veripro was directed by Nationstar to collect sums owed under the Second Mortgage.
7. eTitle Insurance Agency acted as the Successor Trustee under the first deed of trust executed for the
benefit of the BNYM.
8. Stantyn defaulted under the terms of the First Mortgage and eTitle Insurance Agency conducted a
Trustee's Sale of the Property pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust and in accordance with Utah law.
9. After the foreclosure sale, the sum of $48,883.81 was submitted to the Court as excess proceeds on or
about July 13, 2016 by the Successor Trustee of the deed pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29
("Proceeds").
10. Pursuant to an ASSIGmAENT AND RIGHTS TO ALL EXCESS PROCEEDS dated July 15, 2016 from
Stanley Stantyn, ("Emerald Assignment") Emerald has a bona fide interest in the excess sale proceeds.
11. On July 15, 2016, prior to the execution of the Emerald Assignment, Stantyn called Nationstar, in the
presence of Emerald's representative, to verify there was not a balance owing under the Second Mortgage.
12. During the phone call with Nationstar, the representative informed Stantyn that there was not a balance
owing under the loan.
February 13, 2017 06:41 PM
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13. The document titled "Collection History Profile" produced by Nationstar documents the call and includes
the notes "customer stated he wanted to know status of loan adv [sic] customer status of loan is paid ofC'
14. The Nationstar representative was not aware Emerald was listening to Stantyn's phone call.
15. The Collection History Profile further reveals that the loan was approved for a "Prin. Non-Cash Adjustm
[sic]7' and a "PayoffNocash" on March 19, 2015.
16. On August 8, 2016, Stantyn called Nationstar again to verify the account balance of the loan was zero.
The August 8th phone call is documented in the Collection History Profile.
17. The Collection History Profile notes "LOAN TERMS INQUIRY ... since the loan was paid off, there is
no longer available balance on the account."
18. The Collection History Profile further notes on the same date: "DOCUMENT REQUEST INQUIRY ...
borrower requested for the paid in full letter to be sent via mail. Completed. Informed him of tat [sic] to
receive."
19. On August 12, 2016, the Collection History Profile makes the following significant notes:
• "LITIGATION SERVICE RELEASE REFERRAL RECEIVED ... BOA address this to BANA and
Legal for confinnation of handling.,,
• "LITIGATION SERVICE RELEASE REFERRAL COMPLETE"
20. On September 6, 2016, Stantyn called Nationstar to inquire about the payoff statement. In response to the

~

request, Nationstar sent Stantyn the payoff letter via e-mail to the e-maiJ address stanstantyn@gmail.com.
21. The payoff letter references the subject loan number and states "Nationstar Mortgage LLC (FKA Centex
Home Equity, LLC) received payment in full for the above-reference loan number on 3/19/2015. The release
of lien has been initiated and will be sent to the appropriate recordingjurisdiction for recordation."
22. The "release of lien" is presumably referring to a deed of reconveyance. No deed of reconveyance has
been recorded on the Property.
23. At the November 30, 2016 hearing. Veripro questioned the authenticity of the payoff letter. The Court
continued the hearing until December 22, 2016, and then to January 4, 2017 for the sole purpose of
determining the authenticity of the letter.
24. On January 4, 2017, the parties appeared before the Court in a telephone conference. At that conference
February 13, 2017 06:41 PM
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the parties confirmed that Nationstar had recently signed an affidavit verifying that it sent the payoff letter to
Stantyn on September 6, 2016.
25. In the affidavit, Nationstar also claimed that the payoff letter "was mistakenly generated and sent." There
was no explanation as to how the alleged mistake occurred. Importantly, Nationstar did not claim that the
person who sent the letter was not authorized to do so. Nor did Nationstar claim that it sent the letter based
on a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct by Stantyn.
26. Nationstar's new claim that the letter was sent by mistake is not credible or supported by the Collection
History Profile, which demonstrates that the payoff letter was sent because Nationstar considered the debt to
be paid in full whether through cancellation or charge off or otherwise.
27. According to the Co1lection History Profile, Nationstar declined Stantyn's first request for a payoff letter
in March 2015 because "acct was not paid in full but charged off." There was no evidence presented by
Nationstar that its agent did not have access to this note when it responded to Stantyn's second request. The
Collection History Profile also indicates that the legal department was asked "for confirmation of handling."
Nationstar sent the payoff letter to Stantyn on September 6, 2016, a few weeks after the apparent referral to
the legal department on August 12, 2016.
28. Indeed, it was only after Nationstar received notice of the Proceeds and this proceeding that it claimed the
Li)

payoff letter was invalid.
29. Nationstar is not entitled to any of the Proceeds because it charged off the loan and cancelled the debt.
30. Veriprio argues that it was assigned the loan file by Nationstar and therefore Nationstar did not have
authority to charge off the loan or cancel the debt.
3 I. The Court rejects that argument based upon the fact that Nationstar hired Veripro as its agent to enforce
Nationstar's rights to under its loans.
32. The terms of the Revocable Special and Limited Power of Attorney in Favor of Contractor clarify that
Veripro has authority to act as Nationstar's agent in servicing the loans. Nationstar does not forfeit any of its
rights under the agreement and therefore Nationstar has ultimate control in deciding how to enforce, waive,
or preserve its rights under the loans.
33. As the agent ofNationstar, Veripro's interest in the proceeds cannot be superior to those ofNationstar
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and it is bound by Nationstar's cancellation of the debt as confirmed in the payoff letter.
34. Because Veripro has not disputed any of the material facts set forth above, the Court determined that an

evidentiary hearing is not necessary.
35. After considering the evidence and reviewing the relevant case law, the Court rejects Veripro's argument
that it is entitled to invalidate the payoff letter on the ground of unilateral mistake. Veripro cites the Court to

Guardian State Bank v. Stangl,. 778 P. 2d 1, 5 (Utah 1989) in support of its claim for unilateral mistake. Of
note in the Stangl case is the direction that "[w]hen one party's mistake of fact is coupled with knowledge of
the mistake by the other party or a mistake is produced by fraud or other inequitable conduct by the nonerring
party, the mistake provides .a basis for reformation or rescission." Id.
36. Assuming the payoff letter is considered an 11 agreement" between Nationstar and Stantyn, there is no

allegation that Nationstar issued the letter due to fraud or other inequitable conduct by Stantyn. While it is
undisputed that Stantyn knew that he did not "write a check" to pay off the loan, Nationstar has presented no
evidence that would suggest that Stantyn knew that Nationstar intended to collect the debt notwithstanding
the foreclosure of the Property in June 2016 and its representation to him in the July 2016 telephone call that
there was no balance owing under the Second Mortgage.
37. Accordingly, the Court finds that based upon the evidence before it, Nationstar intended to cancel the

debt. The payoff letter is not an agreement that cancelled the debt, but a confinnation ofNationstar's prior
decision to cancel the debt.
38. Emerald argued that Nationstar (or Veripro on behalf ofNationstar) is estopped from claiming it

preserved its right to col1ect the debt by representing that the Joan was paid off Emerald's estoppel claim is

~

based upon the representations made by Nationstar to Stantyn that the loan was paid in full. Emerald claims it
relied upon Nationstar's representations when it paid Stantyn for the assignment of his claim and would be
~

harmed if Nationstar were allowed to change its position. The issue of estoppel is moot based upon the
Court's finding that Nationstar charged off the loan and cancelled the debt. The Court would deny the
estoppel claim, however, based upon the fact that all of Nationstar' s representations were made to Stantyn
and not to Emerald. The Court finds the representations by Nationstar to Stantyn were not intended to be
relied upon by third parties.
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39. Emerald is entitled to claim all the excess proceeds from the sale of the property remaining in the trust
account created by the Court in this case, which is approximately $48,883.81.
40. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1-29, Emerald provided required notice of this Petition for
Adjudication of Priority of Excess Proceeds to all interested parties as set forth in the trustee's affidavit with
the Court on or about July 15, 2016.
41. Therefore, based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, and for good cause
appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

42. The time for submitting claims, or challenges to previously submitted claims, to the excess proceeds
inter-pled into the court in this matter, has expired.
43. The excess funds in the amount of $48,883.81 plus any accrued interest be released to Emerald
Recovery, LLC~ and that the Clerk of the Court is directed to prepare a check in that amount payable to
Emerald Recovery, LLC, and to mail the check to:
~

Emerald Recovery, LLC
c/o Brennan H. Moss
136 E. South Temple, Suite 1900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
44. That such distribution constitutes a final distribution of all amounts inter-pied into the Court. Accordingly
this matter is dismissed with prejudice.
- END OF ORDER-

ISSUED under the seal of the Court: Official signature appears at the top of the first page.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of January 2017. I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

PROPOSED ORDER FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS to be sent to Veripro's counsel John Anderson via email. Mr. Anderson and I worked together from January 19th through January 26th to find mutually
agreeable language. Ultimately, the attorneys were not able to agree upon the language of the proposed order,
thus the attached is filed without the approval of Veripro's attorney.
On this 27th day of January 2017, the foregoing was filed electronically and sent via U.S. Mail to the
following:

Michigan Fidelity Acceptance Corp
dba FranklinDirect
25800 Northwestern Highway #875
Southfield, MI 48075
Michigan Fidelity Acceptance Corp
dba F ranklinDi rect
c/o Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
P.O. Box 2026
Flint, MI 4850 I
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC
350 Highland Drive
Lewisville, TX 75067

Stanley R. Stantyn
13598 S. Deer Mountain Circle
Riverton, UT 84065
~

Stanley R. Stantyn
13598 S. Deer Mountain Circle
Riverton, UT 84065
U.S. Bank National Association as successor trustee to Bank of America, N.A., as successor to LaSalle Bank,
N.A., as Trustee for the certificateholders of the MLMI
Trust, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2005-SL3
c/o BAC, MIC: CA6-914-0l-43
1800 Tapo Canyon Road
Simi Valley, CA 93063

Isl Brennan H. Moss
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